32.1 Logical formulation
My theory is being published for the first time and needs time to grow and to make
predictions. I have already stated two predictions about new physical processes
that should be measurable (see Chapter 24). There is also
one prediction about psychology that could refute my theory, as it predicts that
no artificial intelligence machines could be built with equal rational and motivational
capacities as humans. That is because only God is the source of understanding and
will, and having those capacities requires the full biological details for the human
functional form. If mechanical AI machines could be successfully operated, that
would refute my theory.
The ideas here are analytic deductions from the several Postulates of theism. All
I have shown strictly a priori are the logical connections between those
ideas. Later I examined how plausible consequences of these ideas begin to provide
possible explanations for mental and physical phenomena. My selection of those phenomena
is clearly a posteriori, as are those attempted scientific explanations.
In his pre-critical phase, Kant tried to find the nature of things in themselves
along the lines suggested Part II: see
Kant (1747) for one of his attempts. In
Kant et al. (2002), however, he became conflicted concerning
whether knowledge of spiritual things could be possible and (especially) could be
possible with mainstream empirical rationality. In the end, he reacted against the
presentation of spiritual ideas as presented by Emanuel Swedenborg, apparently in
order to appear conventional. I do not react against Swedenborg’s presentations
of spiritual ideas in the way Kant did.
Yes, I admit that is true. The formal structure of the ‘scientific theism’ does
not make specific predictions about the relative influences of previous
events (instrumental causes) compared with generative powers (principal causes),
so many different detailed scientific theories are possible within its framework.
I think of the situation in this manner: quantum mechanics in physics is not a detailed
theory but rather a theory-framework in which such theories may be formulated (e.g.
by defining the Hilbert space, the observables, and the Hamiltonian). Similarly,
the theistic science here is not a specific theory-framework. It is rather a general
ontological and philosophical structure in which such theory-frameworks may find
a home. It leaves it to empirical investigation and related theorizing to determine
what exactly is true within its framework.